

# **A Soft-Error Hardened Process Portable Embedded Microprocessor**

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# Outline

- **Motivation**
- **Highly Efficient Radiation-hardened Microprocessor Enabling Spacecraft (HERMES2) microarchitecture**
- **Features (added instructions and registers) for software based soft-error recovery and reporting**
- **Circuits and Physical Design**
- **Experimental results**
- **Silicon validation and software based program validation on hardware**
- **Proton Testing results**
- **Summary**




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


# Soft-errors in Logic

- **Ionizing radiation particle deposits charge track in Si**
  - Charge generated by primary or secondary ions
- **Single Event Transient (SET)**
  - Temporary voltage glitch at combinational node







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


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- **Single Event Transient (SET)**
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- **Single Event Upset (SEU)**
  - Directly affects the storage node logic state
- **Multi-Bit Upset (MBU)**
  - Caused by multi-node charge collection (MNCC)
  - Must be mitigated by separating storage cells



Single Bit Upset



Multiple Bit Upset

# Outline


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# HERMES2 Microarchitecture

- **MIPS 4Kc clone**
  - 5-stage pipeline
  - Full TLB based MMU for operating system support (e.g., Linux)
- **From scratch (clean-room) microarchitecture for soft-error hardness**
  - 6<sup>th</sup> pipeline stage added for errors in the branch delay slot
- **Fully synthesizable**
  - With considerable help from specialized CAD flows for proper domain separation to avoid MNCC upsets
  - Custom circuits for cache arrays and register file
    - Based on ultra-low power, fully static readout
  - Custom self-correcting triple modular redundant (TMR) flip-flops
    - Previously proven hard in heavy ion and proton testing
- **Software controlled machine repair and reporting on all soft errors**
  - Any soft-error causes an SE exception (to software handler)
  - Excellent for exploring root causes, not just results of errors




# HERMES2 Microarchitecture



- **Dual modular redundant (DMR) circuits**
  - For *speculative* state and correctable architectural state
  - Two copies allows a mismatch to be detected before committing the speculative machine state to *architectural* state


# HERMES2 Microarchitecture



- **Self-correcting TMR circuits**


- For key *architectural* state, e.g., program counter (PC)
- This machine state is required for architecturally correct (ACE) operation and cannot be otherwise recovered
- Includes all configuration (e.g., CP0) registers, bus interface

# HERMES2 Microarchitecture



- **Register file (RF) and Caches (and TLBs) are DMR**
  - RF A and B copies have parity protected 5-bit groups
  - Caches are DMR for simplicity—allows rapid porting to new processes

# HERMES2 Microarchitecture



- **7 DMR to architectural state error checkers**
  - RF parity (from background scrub)
  - RF entry select (word-line) mismatch and data mismatch
  - DMR to TMR cross-overs for the fill buffer, store buffer, load buffer, and multiply accumulator (MAC)

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# Added Coprocessor Registers

- The MIPS architecture explicitly allows hardware extensions through the coprocessor registers
- Added self-correcting TMR protected registers:
  - **SEE EPC** that stores the PC to return to after an SE exception
  - **RF data and address backup** of the next RF entry to be written
  - **Error Log 1 and 2:** 7 specific error checkers prevent DMR data from committing to architectural state
    - RF parity error (from background scrub)
    - RF word-line (entry) mismatch
    - RF write data mismatch
    - Data Cache Unit (DCU) load and store buffers
    - Instruction fetch unit (IFU) fill buffers
    - Multiply divide unit (MDU) buffers to allow recovery of in-flight results—the RF entries may no longer exist when these instructions retire
    - Instruction Execution Unit (IEU)
  - **Error Mask 1 and 2:** To mask error checkers from firing
    - Critical to proper error injection based validation
  - Registers to control which non-redundant copy for test instructions, etc.

# Added Instructions

- **Instructions added to enable potentially very fast recovery and to control error correction:**
  - ***Back up register file (BURF)*** restores the register file state to that before the instruction that triggered the error
  - ***Repair general purpose register (RGPR)*** repairs RF entry SEUs
    - This instruction compares the DMR copies of a given RF location, and 5-bit groups with parity errors are overwritten from the redundant 5-bit group with correct parity
  - ***TLB invalidate (TLBINV)* and extensions to the standard MIPS CACHE instructions** provide single-cycle TLB/cache invalidation
- **Test and recovery instructions to access single instances of the DMR copies**
  - ***Extensions to the CACHE instructions***
    - Read and write for error reporting and validation, respectively
  - ***RF testability write (RFTW)*** allows single instance writes
    - Can inject errors for processor validation and recovery test checking
  - ***Read RF data (RDRFDAT)*** allows data or parity to be examined independently of the check/repair mechanisms
    - For error reporting

# Software Based Error Recovery

- Checkers fire when mismatching A and B DMR data tries to commit to architectural state
- **A detected SEE error raises an (SE) exception**
  - Executes in uncached memory—*the cache may be the cause*
  - Error handler determines the error is SE and not a normal exception—*Soft-errors take priority, since they can cause other exceptions*
    - **Write and read register 0!** If reads back non-zero, it is SE
    - R0 being read/write allows us a spare register to repair the RF using software
- 1. **If the RF was written at the soft error, back it out**
  - **BURF** instruction puts the old value back
- (optionally) Report RF errors and the cause (**Error Log**)
- 2. **Repair the register file**
  - For each register: **RGPR R1**, **RGPR R2**, ... **RGPR R31**
- (optionally) Report cache errors
- 3. **Invalidate the TLBs, I-caches and write-through D-caches**
- 4. **Return from the exception**
  - The machine is now 'clean'
  - Restart by re-executing the last retired instruction
- **SE exception handler can be**  
as few as **86** or as many as **115,328** instructions




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# Physical Design



- **Auto-place and route flow keeps DMR and TMR domains separate to avoid MNCC upsetting 2 copies**






# Physical Design

- **Auto-place and route flow keeps DMR and TMR domains separate to avoid MNCC upsetting 2 copies**



- **Separate clock trees for each of the A, B, C domains**
  - **Clock SET or clock gating enable upset immune**


- **Self-correcting TMR flip-flops (FFs) contain key architectural state**
  - **This logic self-corrects and thus does not report errors**
  - **Layout prevents MNCC upsets**
    - **Self-correcting storage bits are separated by 3 rows (and wells)**






# Circuit Design: Self-correcting FFs



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# Static RF Cell



- **1-R 1-W RF Cell features**
  - **Dual-ended clocked write**
  - **Single ended fully static read-out**
    - **Two RWLs required per cell**
- **Layout fits standard cell sizes**
  - **Compatible with 7-track library**
    - **Ability to use library cells in RF array reduces design effort**
  - **Horizontal M3 power and bit-lines**
  - **Vertical M2 word-lines**




# Static RF Read Timing




- **No read clocked enable causes RWL contention**
  - Due to systematic timing variations in the decoder
- **MUXsel delayed to coincide with the RWL/RWLN pair to avoid output glitching**

# Sub-bank and Byte Writes

- **Byte write support required by application**
  - Cache with byte stores, e.g., SB \$1 8(\$5)
- **Global WWL qualified by byte write enable to generate local WWL**
  - This is susceptible to multi-bit soft-errors as storage in one word is adjacent—we don't care because the caches are DMR





- **The data sub-bank has 16 entries, each 128-bits**
  - Organized as 32-bits words
  - Cache is 4-way set-associative
  - Each word belongs to a different set
  - Each of the 16 bytes can be written independently and at most 4 bytes are written simultaneously







# Cache Cluster

- **Cache cluster has 4 sub-arrays and a tag array**
  - 1k-byte of data and associated tag match, way select and word select circuitry
  - **Data from each way is interleaved**
    - Minimizes swizzling in the APR cluster routing for efficiency




# DMR Register File

- **Same static RF read for low power and low voltage operation**
  - **Three read ports**
    - **Two for operands**
    - **Third for background scrubbing and saving old value before a store (required for added BURF instruction)**
  - **DMR WWLs prevent erroneous write**

[illegible]

# Error Checking Circuits



- **RF WL mismatch checker (example)**
  - **One's catching domino circuits detect even transient mismatches**
  - **DMR WLs are compared in a timing window (CheckClk)**
    - **Delay for them to settle and avoid timing variability issues**
  - **Output latched for pseudo-static operation**




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# HERMES2 Silicon Results

- Implemented on a foundry *low standby power* 90-nm process
- **312 MHz at 1.2 V  $V_{DD}$** 
  - **143 mW power dissipation running MAC/cache tests (best RHBD power/performance published)**
    - **Fully cached operation (no I/O) so the machine is at 100% activity**



- **330 MHz at 1.4 V  $V_{DD}$**
- **Minimum operating  $V_{DD}$  = 650 mV (Lowest RHBD processor  $V_{DD}$ )**
  - **Limited by standard foundry I/O—should be operable below 300 mV**

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# Silicon Validation

- **HERMES instructions allow software error injection**

- **Allows:**

- **Validation of the hardware for soft-errors without beam time**
- **Provably correct software error correction response**

```
RF Parity checker error injection test:
MTC0 $0, $22 // Turn Error Checkers off
RFTW $5      // Write $5A and $5B with different data
MTC0 $30, $22 // Turn Error Checkers on
// RF Parity checker fires, SEE exception address
// Error log 2 written with RF Parity error
```

| CLK   | Controls         | AValid | Address  | Data in  | Write | Data out |
|-------|------------------|--------|----------|----------|-------|----------|
| 00000 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc001a0 | 00000000 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 00001 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc001a0 | 00000000 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 00002 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc001a4 | 00000000 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 00014 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00000 | 3c000001 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 00021 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00004 | 1c000011 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 00028 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00008 | 00000000 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 03115 | 1000111100000110 | 1      | 000006c4 | 4081b007 | 0     | 11110000 |
| 03116 | 1000111100000110 | 1      | 000006c8 | 00a52826 | 0     | 11110000 |
| 03127 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00000 | 3c000001 | 0     | 11110000 |
| 03134 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00004 | 1c000011 | 0     | 11110000 |
| 03141 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00008 | 00000000 | 0     | 11110000 |
| ...   |                  |        |          |          |       |          |
| 03701 | 0000111100000101 | 1      | 00000000 | 00000000 | 1     | ffffffff |
| 03702 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00188 | ac230004 | 0     | ffffffff |
| 03709 | 0000111100000101 | 1      | 1fc0f000 | 00000000 | 1     | 00000000 |
| 03710 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc0018c | ac230008 | 0     | 00000000 |
| 03717 | 0000111100000101 | 1      | 1fc0f004 | 00000000 | 1     | 04000000 |

```
RF dual redundant wordline error injection test:
RFTW $15, $14
// Write $14B and $15A simultaneously
// RF dual redundant wordline error checker fires
// Error log 1 written with RF wordline error
```

| CLK   | Controls         | AValid | Address  | Data in  | Write | Data out |
|-------|------------------|--------|----------|----------|-------|----------|
| ...   |                  |        |          |          |       |          |
| 00200 | 1010111100000110 | 1      | 000004ac | 4084b005 | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00204 | 1100111100000110 | 1      | 000004b0 | 7000000d | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00205 | 1000111100000110 | 1      | 000004b4 | 0000000f | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00206 | 1000111100000110 | 1      | 000004b8 | 0000000f | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00207 | 1010111100000110 | 1      | 000004bc | 0000000f | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00210 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00000 | 3c000001 | 0     | bff01000 |
| 00214 | 0000111100000110 | 1      | 1fc00004 | 1c00001b | 0     | bff01000 |
| ...   |                  |        |          |          |       |          |
| 01910 | 0000111100000101 | 1      | 1ff0127c | 00000000 | 1     | 04000000 |

SE exception goes to general  
exception address 0x1fc0000

(Note same cause but in  
different registers)



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# Proton Testing

- **UC Davis Crocker Labs cyclotron**
  - 63 MeV protons
  - $1.3 \times 10^7$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup>-sec flux (ave.)
  - $1.004 \times 10^{11}$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup> total fluence
- **MAC/cache and MAC intensive programs**
- **509 SE exceptions taken**
  - 551 checker reported errors
- **All perfectly corrected by handler with 100% return to program execution**
  - No anomalous instruction or data fetches



|                                   | MDU  | RF<br>Write<br>back | RF<br>Word<br>line | IFU  | IEU   | RF<br>Parity | DCU   | Total<br>Errors |
|-----------------------------------|------|---------------------|--------------------|------|-------|--------------|-------|-----------------|
| Total by type:                    | 5    | 104                 | 0                  | 25   | 180   | 8            | 229   | 551             |
| Cross-section ( $\mu\text{m}^2$ ) | 0.50 | 10.35               | 0.00               | 2.49 | 17.92 | 0.80         | 22.80 | 54.86           |

- **Zero measured soft-error cross-section post correction!**

# Summary

- **HERMES2 has:**
  - **No uncorrectable soft errors in 500+ events with proton testing to over  $10^{11}$  protons/cm<sup>2</sup> fluence**
  - **312 MHz operation at spec 1.2 V  $V_{DD}$  dissipating 143 mW**
  - **Operable down to 650 mV  $V_{DD}$  for ultra low power operation**
- **Demonstrated efficacy of software controlled soft-error recovery**
  - **DMR speculative pipelines allow soft-errors to be “caught”**
  - **Errors cause an exception**
    - **Triggering error cleanup and reporting handler**
  - **Software allows detailed reporting to determine *error root causes* (not just the final manifestation of the error)**
  - **New instructions enable state repair and reporting, as well as hardware validation and provably correct software recovery**
- **Automated RHBD design approaches and limited custom circuits allows fast porting to new fabrication processes**

# **Thank you for your attention**

## **This work was funded by**



## **Questions?**